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It would not be an exaggeration to say that in the United States, law
and sexuality has, within the last five years at least, become one of the
fastest growing fields in legal theory. From a scattering of articles,
comments and notes chiefly within the civil rights arena, scholarly
works in "queer legal theory," as it is commonly called, can now be
found everywhere from the most august journals to ones that attract
less attention. The output has been rising to such an extent that it
has long become impossible (to this writer at least) to keep up to date
on even just the most tantalizing of new titles. Moreover, queer legal
scholars are publishing well beyond the usual traps. Articles by such
scholars are appearing in everything from comparative literature
journals to queer law journals published only on the Internet to
architectural journals. A recent survey by Professor Francisco Valdes
shows that in March 1995, seventy-seven law schools in the United
States offer courses in law and sexuality or teach it as a major
component of a related course such as Gender, Sexuality and the Law
or AIDS and the Law.' Professor William Rubenstein's anthology of
materials, Lesbians, Gay Men, and the Law,2 published in 1993 has been
prescribed reading for many of these courses since it first came out.
Next year, Foundation Press is due to release a course book titled
Sexuality and the Law, edited by Professors William Eskridge and Nan
Hunter.
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1. Francisco Valdes, Tracking and Assessing the (Non)Inclusion of Courses on Sexuality
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After a Decade of Effort (1995) (unpublished, on file with the author).
2. LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW (William B. Rubenstein ed., The New Press 1993).
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Yet, despite this burgeoning market, Didi Herman and Carl Stychin
(respectively Senior Lecturer and Lecturer in Law at Keele University
in the United Kingdom) noted that there was not a book of critical
essays on queer legal topics. More specifically, the editors perceived
a need for a book that fulfills the task of being "a critical, analytical
text about the politics of lesbians and gay men engaging with and
being engaged by the law."3 In fulfilling this task, Herman and
Stychin have brought together ten essays (all but two of which had
not been previously published) written by (as the editors confessed)
young scholars whom they knew, whose works they admired, and
"whose work may not yet have achieved a wide, international
exposure."4 Although I can think of at least one contributor who
might not precisely describe herself in that way (young and interna-
tionally unexposed, that is), the editors and their publishers must be
congratulated for their effort in promoting these talented scholars.
And there is much to genuinely admire in this collection. For the
main, the essays attempt to grapple with theory rather than a
"straight" description of legal doctrine. They intelligently examine
the complex relationship between politics, legality and sexuality. Yet,
for the most part, the essays are not written in such a way as to either
require a deep knowledge of law nor postmodern philosophy for the
reader to be able to gain much from reading them. True, there is a
wide range of styles and methods represented here, and for all the
emphases the editors put on a critical perspective, most of the essays
are written in an accessible style. The essays are arranged in three
groups: "The Subjects of Law," "The Implications of Strategy," and
"Law, Reform, Struggle and the State." Although the editors give a
concise description of each of the essays under each of these groups
in their Introduction, this reader did not find that much really
depended on the positioning or ordering of the essays under these
headings. A final general stylistic point: in addition to the Introduc-
tion, the editors have provided a useful precis at the beginning of
each essay wherein they sketch out the main arguments of the piece.
Readers with specific interests may therefore quickly determine
whether these diverse essays might warrant investing their time and
money.
In this regard, this reviewer certainly found ample to warrant both.
Space prohibits a detailed exegesis of each of the essays, but several
3. LEGAL INVERSIONS: LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE POLMCS OF LAW x (Didi Herman &
Carl Stychin eds., 1995) [hereinafter INVERSIONS].
4. Id. at xv.
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stand out in my mind. Mary Eaton's essay, Homosexual Unmodified:
Speculations on Law's Discourse, Race, and the Construction of Sexual
Identity is easily the most theoretically interesting of the three essays
collected under the first theme, "The Subjects of Law." Coming as it
does at the end of the first Part, a part wherein the editors tell us that
several of the authors adopt "postmodern and Foucauldian approach-
es to the relationship between discourse and socio-political identi-
ties,"5 Eaton's is clearly the essay whose methodology and style are
most rigorously postmodern and Foucauldian. Analyzing the interplay
of racial and homosexual discourses through two American anti-
discrimination cases involving gay African-American litigants, Eaton
sheds remarkable and important light on the relationship between the
categories of race and homosexuality. She argues persuasively that
"homosexuality is legally coded as white, or to put matters conversely,
that race has been legally coded as heterosexual."6 Although I find
myself agreeing heartily with her, the lucidity and forthrightness of
her conclusions simply left me eagerly wanting to see her push the
analysis further into the realm of exploring more precisely the
relationship between race, homosexuality and gender, perhaps into
a consideration of these categories as sometimes implicated in their
mutual construction. This epiphenomenological praxis can be clearly
explored through the agency of the gay Asian stereotype, as I am
attempting to argue in my own research, and it is at once exciting,
tantalizing and to an extent frustrating to note her conclusion,
without much more elaboration, that the "discomfort with a radical
estrangement between the two categories (of sex and sexuality)
suggest a recognition, unseen in the racial context, that there is
actually some connection between them."7 Moreover, by placing
propositions such as the following at the end of a paragraph, Eaton
teases us with provocative thoughts, ones that raise more questions
than it answers:
Race enters the discourse of sexual identity only analogically and
never derivatively. This suggests that, although race and sex
ultimately may share the same fate, expulsions from the realm of
sexual orientation have been effected differently.'
However, what is especially exciting about Eaton's essay is her
determination not to leave the site of the deconstructive project with
a heap of broken parts. For Eaton, theoretical musing is wasted
5. I at xi.
6. Id. at 51.
7. Id. at 67.
8. INVERSIONS, supra note 3, at 68.
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energy if radical, strategic and political lessons are not also part of the
point. In her epilogue, she suggests that a "re-racializing" of the
category "homosexual" can produce important lessons for those who
wish to break down the boundaries that maintain the exclusion of the
homosexual as an outsider class.
Some of the virtues of Eaton's essay are indicative of the wider
virtues of the collection as a whole. Diversity of perspective is a
definite and welcomed strength within this book. Race is included as
either a main topic of an article, as in Eaton's essay, but is also not
forgotten in the other essays such as Cynthia Petersen's Envisioning a
Lesbian Equality Jurisprudence in Part II of this collection. Lesbian
issues are given important prominence especially in Part II, with the
inclusion of A Parent(ly) Knot: Can Heather Have Two Mommies? by
Shelley A. M. Gavigan, as well as Katherine Arnup's and Susan Boyd's
essay Familial Disputes? Sperm Donors, Lesbian Mothers, and Legal
Parenthood. Moreover, Ruthann Robson's original treatment of the
absence of lesbian criminal defendants as a category for serious legal
reflection (Convictions: Theorizing Lesbians and Criminal Justice) in Part
III adds to the strength of including lesbian issues within the covers
of this collection.
Quite apart from gender diversity, this book is exceptional also in
terms of its geographical and national diversity. Readers will find
essays dealing with cases and statutes from Ireland, Britain and
Canada as well as the United States. Nevertheless, if one is to find
any fault in this collection, it would be that the editors have generally
left it to the reader to make the comparative analysis arising from this
diversity ofjurisdiction. Their contributors may be excused from not
talking to one another, but when the editors lead us to believe in the
Introduction that they have invited their vastly dispersed young
friends to come together in a book to talk about lesbians, gay men
and the politics of law, it would have been nice to have heard their
hosts say something about the theoretical consequences of such
diversity.
American readers, for example, who are usually fed a strict diet of
local law will find a fascinating array of resources and quotes from
other common law lands. I would venture to say that even the
American reader with an above average intestinal fortitude for local
conservative statements hostile to gay and lesbian rights, might find
some of the legal material from other common law jurisdictions a
little hard to stomach. Take, for example, this catalog of normative
statements regarding male homosexuality, delivered by Chief Justice
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O'Higgins of the Supreme Court of Ireland, in Norris v. Attorney
Genera 4 decided in 1984:
(1) Homosexuality has always been condemned in Christian
teaching as being morally wrong. It has equally been regarded by
society for many centuries as an offence against nature and a very
serious crime.
(2) Exclusive homosexuality, whether the conditions be congenital
or acquired, can result in great distress and unhappiness for the
individual and can lead to depression, despair and suicide.
(3) The homosexually oriented can be importuned into a
homosexual lifestyle which can become habitual.
(4) Male homosexual conduct has resulted, in other countries, in
the spread of all forms of venereal disease and this has now become
a significant public-health problem in England.
(5) Homosexual conduct can be inimical to marriage and is per se
harmful to it as an institution.9
In Davina Cooper's and Didi Herman's essay, Getting the Family Right:
Legislating Heterosexuality in Britain, 1986-91, we find these remarkable
statements from the Earl of Halsbury's speech in the House of Lords
on December 18, 1986:
[W]e have for several decades past been emancipating minorities
who claimed that they were disadvantaged. Are they grateful? Not
a bit. We emancipated races and got inverted racism. We
emancipated homosexuals and they condemn heterosexism as
chauvinist sexism, male oppression and so on. They will push us
off the pavement if we give them a chance. I am, in their jargon,
a homophone [sic], a heterosexist exploitationist. The whole
vocabulary of the loony Left is let loose in a wild confusion of
Marxism, Trotskyism, anarchism and homosexual terminology.' °
Those [homosexuals] who make the worst of their situation are the
sick ones who suffer from a psychological syndrome whose
symptoms are as follows: first of all, exhibitionism; they want the
world to know all about them; secondly. promiscuity; thirdly,
proselytizing; they want to persuade other people that their way of
life is a good one; fourthly, boasting of homosexual achievements
as if they were due to and not in spite of sexual inversion; lastly,
they act as reservoirs of venereal diseases of all kinds."
Equally remarkable is the ability of Cooper and Herman to write with
perfect coolness, calmness and reason about the former statement
9. INVERSIONS, supra note 3, at 31.
10. INVERSIONS, supra note 3, at 168.
11. INVERSIONS, supra note 3, at 169.
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that "Halsbury's comments explicitly construct an 'us' and a
'them,""' 2 and of the latter statement, that "(i)mplicit in Halsbury's
speech is (among other things) the equation of morality with societal
stability."13
If one were to regard these essays as different colored mosaics
placed next to each other, and if one were to stand back and try to
discern a picture composed by these tiles, that picture would be one
that told the story of the failure of legal liberalism to ensure the
liberation and equality of gays and lesbians within the traditional legal
framework. This is one of the main strengths of this book, one on
which the editors seem to be strangely silent. Yet collectively, I
thought that the essays made a strong case for a re-examination of the
power and worth of working within legal orthodoxy as a means of
effecting meaningful change. There is much that legal thinkers can
gain from this collection, and much, one dare say, that gay and
lesbian civil rights groups can learn as well about legal strategies. It
is therefore an important achievement for queer legal scholarship in
general and for all people interested in law and queer politics that the
editors have succeeded in bringing together such a fine array of
scholars and presented their ideas in a very readable style and form.
12. INVERSIONS, supra note 3, at 168.
13. INVERSIONS, supra note 3, at 169.
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